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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Face the Nation

STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE March 28, 1982 11:30 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Senator Barry Goldwater

GEORGE HERMAN: Senator Goldwater, the people of El Salvador are voting today, with the possibility of a victory by the extreme right. What do you feel should be the United States policy towards whoever wins the election in El Salvador?

SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER: I think we ought to try to get along with them. I think we should do whatever we can in a noncombatant way to help the country. Central America is as important to us, I think, as any part of the world, probably. And I wouldn't want to see us go down there with armed forces if there's a chance of getting the whole thing to work. And I think maybe we can do it.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview on Face the Nation with Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Senator Goldwater will be questioned by CBS News congressional correspondent Phil Jones; by Jack Germond, syndicated columnist for the Baltimore Evening Sun; and by the moderator, CBS News correspondent George Herman.

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HERMAN: Senator Goldwater, it was your opinion in your first answer that we should get along with whoever wins the election in El Salvador. But supposing it should turn out to be the extreme right wing, Major D'Aubuisson, who says his first action would be to hang President Duarte, a man who's been -- D'Aubuisson has been called a psychopathic butcher. Should we get along with him, or should we put him in some kind of quarantine?

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SALT LAKE CITY TRIBUNE (UT)
31 MARCH 1982

Readies Another Gag

Once more Adm. Bobby R. Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has thrown the gauntlet to the ground, threatening the American scientific community, in effect, that if it doesn't voluntarily reduce the flow of technical information with possible military and industrial application to the Soviet Union the government will.

The admiral has professed surprise that a similar statement made in January was taken as a threat by scientists and academicians when he raised the possibility of government intervention to stem the flow of ideas during a talk before the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

At that time he said he was aghast that his remarks were taken as a threat by his agency rather than the private views of a "knowledgeable citizen."

Monday, however, there was no doubt that he was expressing the opinions of the deputy director of CIA. Inman reiterated his position before a joint meeting of two subcommittees of the House Science and Technology Committee. "It is time for the scientific community to accept that there is an outflow, and that outflow is potentially damaging," he told the Congressmen. Scientists, particularly those affiliated with educational institutions, he said should not wait for government regulation (as if it is an inevitability) but should "set up their own mechanism to limit the outflow."

In other words, he is telling the academic community to either shut up or the government will shut them up.

The intelligence officer was testifying in connection with government proposals to restrict access to certain non-secret but sensitive scientific information.

Besides being what amounts to a contradiction of terms (if something is non-secret it shouldn't be sensitive) the proposal is a threat to the viability of American scientific processes. The free flow of ideas and the ready exchange of data are the bedrock of this nation's scientific prowess.

If the government demands, or enforces, a stifling of that free flow of ideas and information the risk is high that America will soon find itself sitting in the back seat with the scientists of some less restrictive nation in the driver's seat.

Although the admiral denied it vigorously, his proposals are precisely what Rep. Albert Gore Jr., D-Tenn., called "the first step along the road that has made Soviet science so pitiful."

The fears of Dr. Frank Press, president of the National Academy of Sciences, deserve paramount consideration. He worries, he told the subcommittees, that government efforts to muzzle scientists might force basic research with indirect military applications out of universities, "thus denying this important resource to the Defense Department. We should consider how much our security is harmed by denying government access to many of the nation's most brilliant scientists."

In other words, is a penny's worth of additional security worth the pound of lost and unfettered research? In all probability, no.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 March 1982

Don't build walls around scientific discovery

The free flow of information and ideas is vital to the advancement of science and technology. No nation has provided better proof than the United States. To maintain America's leading contribution to the world in these fields, the freedom of inquiry and research must be protected against new pressures for secrecy coming from both the private and governmental sectors. Fortunately, protective efforts are underway with at least some cooperation from these sectors themselves. Such efforts must be vigorously pursued not only in the name of constitutional rights but in the name of the very commercial and national security needs supposed to be served by the new secrecy.

Note that officially classified "secret" information is not the issue here. The scientists and universities trying to protect their freedom are not trying to escape the responsibility for protecting classified secrets. They are trying to prevent restraints on the fruitful exchange of information under heavy financing by private companies seeking to keep results of research to themselves — or under initiatives by government agencies seeking to keep even unclassified information away from potential adversaries.

Last week a conference of university presidents and genetic engineering company executives took a step toward clarifying responsibilities in commercial arrangements between private companies and educational institutions. They came up with guidelines for fashioning agreements that, among other things, "do not promote a secrecy that will

harm the progress of science." Here is something to build on — the more effectively so if the discussion expands to include independent voices concerned about the commercial impact on universities accepting more and more agreements under the economic gun.

This week governmental pressures for secrecy of unclassified information came to the fore again when Adm. Bobby Inman, deputy director of the CIA, appeared at a congressional hearing. He renewed his January call for the scientific community to place voluntary restrictions on itself or risk governmental restraints.

Already a number of universities have had to resist Washington efforts to change their

practices on foreign scholars' access to unclassified information. Stanford, for example, was asked to restrict certain kinds of technical data from Chinese students and a Soviet robotics specialist — one whose work, incidentally, is said to have significantly aided American progress in the field. Stanford refused, noting that no secret or classified research is permitted on the campus.

Two panels of public and private officials have been set up to consider the matter of scientific freedom and national security needs. They properly want to avoid a collision course between government and the researchers it depends upon to ensure that the nation's defenses stay up to date.

Their work is important, because freedom of ideas and security are not opposed but inseparable. A group of university presidents put it well some time ago when protesting an effort to impose export restrictions on university research activities:

"Restricting the free flow of information among scientists and engineers would alter fundamentally the system that produced the scientific and technological lead that the government is now trying to protect and leave us with nothing to protect in the very near future. The way to protect that lead is to make sure the country's best talent is encouraged to work in the relevant areas, not to try to build a wall around past discoveries."

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STATINTL
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 March 1982

The news—briefly

STATINTL

Curb on US scientific flow to Soviet Union is urged

Washington

The US government may be forced to impose tough restrictions on the flow of scientific information to the Soviet Union; Bobby Ray Inman, deputy director of central intelligence, said.

"I think in six months, a year, or 18 months as the government begins to see the full magnitude of what the Soviet Union gets from the West, there will be a decision," he told a House Science and Technology subcommittee.

He said it is vital for scientists to begin voluntarily consulting the government and in some cases submitting research for prepublication review in an effort to forestall legal restrictions on the flow of information.

But Rep. Albert Gore (D) of Tennessee said legal restrictions would be harmful to US science and academic freedom.

STATINTL

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3A

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
(Limited Edition)
30 March 1982

CIA urges restraint on technical data

By David Roberts
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

CIA deputy director Bobby Inman, after describing a "hemorrhage" of sensitive U.S. technical information being pirated by the Soviets, called for academic researchers to establish a voluntary peer review program to screen possibly sensitive publications.

Inman told a joint congressional panel that such a plan will be necessary because the Reagan administration's efforts at tightening security in other areas will force Soviet spies to turn to the academic community for information.

The voluntary review program, Inman said, would be similar to a system currently being used to help prevent release of scientific research involving secret coding methods. Scientists and mathematicians working in this area voluntarily forward academic papers to the National Security Agency for review prior to publication. In this, however, the authors are not obligated to withhold publications even if NSA claims they should.

Inman warned that if the academic community did not undertake voluntary restraints, the federal government might impose mandatory measures "six months, one year, 18 months down the road."

High Stakes

Other witnesses at the conference agreed with Inman's contention that greater security was needed, although many expressed reservations about how such restrictions might be applied.

Frank Press, president of the National Academy of Science said that a panel of

experts is studying the problem, and expects to have preliminary recommendations by September on steps the academic community, industry and government could take to solve it.

"Both parties and the country have a high stake in resolving the controversy," Press said.

Inman, former director of the National Security Agency, has taken a lead in denouncing the free exchange of scientific information with the Soviets.

Outflow of Information

"We should no longer accept as a given that the United States benefits from such an exchange," he told two subcommittees of the House Science and Technology Committee. They met to understand a number of administration proposals to control the flow of sensitive information to Eastern bloc countries. "It is time for scientists to come to accept that there is an outflow of information," Inman said. "This is an enormous outflow, not to a friend, but an adversary...greatly reducing the time necessary to get major [Soviet] weapons systems into production."

According to Inman, researchers accept the restrictions on publishing information resulting from research done under industry contracts without losing their academic freedom, so they should be able to accept national security restrictions as well.

"We need to assess the proper balance between legitimate national security considerations and possible damage to our tradition of freedom in academic and scientific institutions," said Rep. Albert Gore, Jr., one of the two subcommittee chairmen.

By ROBERT REINHOLD

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 29 — Adm. Bobby R. Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, urged the scientific community today to come forward with proposals to reduce the flow of technical information with military and industrial applications to the Soviet Union or face the prospect of Government-imposed constraints.

"It is time for the scientific community to accept that there is an outflow, and that outflow is potentially damaging," Admiral Inman said at a Congressional hearing. Academic scientists, he went on, should not wait

for Government regulation but should "set up their own mechanisms now to determine ideas to limit the outflow."

He spoke at a joint hearing of two subcommittees of the House Science and Technology Committee into Government proposals to restrict access to certain nonsecret but sensitive scientific information. These efforts have aroused intense unease among academic scientists, many of whom say they fear clumsy bureaucratic intrusion that might undermine American scientific prowess.

The fears were deepened in January when Admiral Inman raised the possibility of Government intervention to stem the disclosing of ideas. At the time he was speaking before the American Association for the Advancement of Science and today he complained bitterly that news accounts had exaggerated his remarks. He professed surprise that his comments had been taken as a threat by his agency rather than as the private views of a "knowledgeable citizen."

Admiral Inman said today that he was trying to serve as a "goat" to the academic world, to get it to act before more onerous proposals came from the Departments of Defense, Commerce and State, and the National Security Agency, not the Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative Albert Gore Jr., the Tennessee Democrat who heads the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, suggested that Admiral Inman was taking the "first step along the road that has made Soviet science so pitiful." Admiral Inman heatedly retorted that he was not proposing censorship.

Sees Rise in University Leaks

While he said that only a "small percentage" of technical leakage came from college campuses, Admiral Inman predicted it would rise soon if counter-espionage efforts succeeded in closing off industrial and other sources to Soviet agents. He said universities already restricted access to research to protect their commercial interests.

Lawrence J. Brady, assistant Secre-

ary of Commerce for trade administration, said the department, which enforces export controls, was concerned about academic research because colleges had become more involved in work with industrial applications. He called it a "sensitive and complex problem" to restrict sensitive technology without "unduly burdening scientific research."

However, later today, he spoke differently to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. He complained that the Administration confronted "a strong belief in the academic community that they have an inherent right to teach, conduct research and develop exchange programs free of Government review or oversight."

"Clearly we cannot allow our vital technological lead to be whittled away," he said, "simply because we refuse to take the time and trouble to try and strike a balance between the demands of academic freedom and the needs of national security."

At the hearing, Dr. Frank Press, president of the National Academy of Sciences, said he feared that Government efforts might force some basic research with indirect military applications out of universities, "thus denying this important resource to the Defense Department.

"We should consider how much our security is harmed by denying Government access to many of the nation's most brilliant scientists," he said.

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ON PAGE A3THE WASHINGTON POST
30 March 1982

STATINTL

Inman Repeats Warning of U.S. Technology

By Philip J. Hilts
Washington Post Staff Writer

Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, deputy CIA director, acknowledged yesterday that scientific papers are only a "very small part of the problem" of the "hemorrhage of this country's technology" to the Soviets.

But at the same time, in speaking to two House subcommittees on science and technology, he again warned that there is a "massive Soviet effort" to acquire U.S. technology, and if scientists do not voluntarily censor some of their papers on sensitive technology, "I think in six months, a year, or 18 months, as the government begins to see the full magnitude of what the Soviet Union gets from the West," there may be a decision to impose restrictions.

At a January meeting here of scientists, Inman warned that if they did not voluntarily let the government review some of their sensitive papers, tough restrictions might result.

Yesterday, Inman said he regretted using the phrase "tidal wave of public outrage," but added that then and now he was trying to "goad" scientists into acting before the government does.

Also testifying for the administration yesterday was Lawrence J. Brady, assistant secretary of commerce, whose remarks were restrained compared with what he said later at a luncheon with the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

There, Brady said the Reagan administration has "aggressively stepped up our enforcement efforts" under the export administration act in the past year. He cited criminal prosecutions in two California cases.

One case involved a shipment of copper water-cooled mirrors used in high-power lasers. The shipment to the Soviet Union was made through

an intermediary in West Germany. The California company's president drew a 10-year prison sentence, all but six months of it suspended.

Brady said the Soviet KGB has built an "industrial-espionage network of frightening proportions, one that he said has "blanketed the developed capitalist countries... sucking up formulas, patents, blueprints and know-how with frightening precision."

He said the administration is still trying to develop a critical-technologies list that it hopes to make "the kingpin of the whole system" of preventing seepage of sensitive data and equipment. But at least a few in the audience of some 450 seemed chagrined by Brady's suggestion that the role of the multinational firms in the transfer process is "going to be a public policy issue in the next decade."

"How long can we wait?" one questioner demanded. "This has been going on since 1956."

At the House hearing, Inman said that he believes that 70 percent of the problem of the "outflow of technology" comes from Soviet espionage activities, and that only a small percentage of the other 30 percent can be attributed to the failure of scientists to keep sensitive work secret.

But he said he expects the Soviets to concentrate on the other 30 percent much more in the future as the administration succeeds in halting more of the Soviet espionage.

Rep. Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.) questioned Inman's arguments and said the United States should "not take even the first step down that road [of a closed society] that makes Soviet research so pitiful."

Robert Rosenzweig, a vice president of Stanford University, said the premise of the administration—that there is a threat to national se-

curity from open scientific exchange—"is wrong. We should reject it.... It has always seemed risky to run an open society; perhaps that is why there are so few of them."

In a related development, officials at Commerce said yesterday they are investigating conflicting accounts of a shipment of \$960,000 in water purification equipment to Libya that the Customs Service seized in Brooklyn on Friday.

Customs spokesman Louis Gerig said his agency determined that the shipment had not reached the Wattertown, Mass., loading docks of the exporting firm, Ionics Inc., until after the administration's embargo on high-technology exports to Libya took effect March 12. A Commerce spokesman said "we were given assurances by the firm that the stuff had gone to the docks on March 11."

Staff writer George Lardner Jr. contributed to this report.



ADM. BOBBY RAY INMAN

seeking to "goad" scientists to act

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 ARTICLE APPEARED PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
 ON PAGE 5A 30 MARCH 1982

CIA official urges universities: Keep data from Soviets

By Tim Ahern
 Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Top intelligence officials, concerned about a "massive Soviet effort" to acquire U.S. technology, told Congress yesterday that American scientists and universities should reduce the flow of sensitive information to the Soviet Union.

Unless the transfer of information is halted voluntarily, there may be pressure from the federal government to block it, Adm. Bobby Inman, deputy director of the CIA, told two House subcommittees.

Soviet efforts to gain access to basic research "is only a small part of the problem" of the "outflow of technology," Inman said.

There has been "a massive Soviet effort" by a "wide range of means" to learn about U.S. research, particularly applied technology, he said.

About 70 percent of the Soviet efforts to learn about U.S. technology come through intelligence or legal and illegal attempts to purchase that information, he said, adding that most of the efforts are aimed at finding out about applied technology,

such as weapons systems or missile guidance information.

But U.S. agencies are stepping up their counterintelligence efforts and "if we are successful, we will cut off many of their avenues," Inman said.

That, he predicted, will lead to Soviet efforts to gather information about basic research, much of which is done at universities.

Attempts to restrict the flow of basic information do not have to infringe on academic freedom, he said.

As more and more universities are moving into areas that have commercial applications, such as genetic engineering, they have restricted the availability of information about their research, he said, suggesting that such restrictions could be applied to national-security matters.

"I have not put a proposal on the table to control anything," Inman said, explaining that he was trying to be a "gadfly" and simply wanted to raise the warning flag.

In an open society such as the United States, "you'll never control the flow of information without unac-

ceptable damage" to basic freedoms. But there needs to be an attempt to impede the flow, he added.

George Millburn, acting deputy undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said the exchange of information between the United States and the Soviet Union is "one-sided." He said there is only "very, very minimal" benefit to the United States.

The administration is considering a draft executive order on secrecy that would permit the government to more easily claim national security in keeping information secret.

That proposal and Inman's warning have raised concerns in the academic community that the administration wants to restrict the flow of information.

29 March 1982

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FAM-TECHNOLOGY (2 TAKES)

WASHINGTON, MARCH 29, REUTER -- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MAY BE FORCED TO IMPOSE TOUGH RESTRICTIONS ON THE FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION TO THE SOVIET UNION, DEPUTY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) DIRECTOR BOBBY RAY INMAN SAID TODAY.

"I THINK IN SIX MONTHS, A YEAR, OR 18 MONTHS AS THE GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO SEE THE FULL MAGNITUDE OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION GETS FROM THE WEST, THERE WILL BE A DECISION," HE TOLD A HOUSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE.

HE SAID IT IS VITAL FOR SCIENTISTS TO BEGIN VOLUNTARILY CONSULTING WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND IN SOME CASES SUBMITTING RESEARCH FOR PRE-PUBLICATION REVIEW IN AN EFFORT TO FORESTALL LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE FLOW OF INFORMATION.

MR INMAN, A NAVY ADMIRAL, SAID A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S GAINS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY HAVE RESULTED FROM LEGAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

BUT REPRESENTATIVE ALBERT GORE, A TENNESSEE DEMOCRAT, SAID ANY LEGAL RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE HARMFUL TO U.S. SCIENCE.

CITING A DANGER TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM, MR GORE SAID SUCH RESTRICTIONS COULD THWART SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES AND THAT SIMILAR CONSTRAINTS IN THE SOVIET UNION "ARE WHAT MAKES SOVIET SCIENCE SO PITIFUL."

MORE 1241 CH

The Calendar

Monday

Tough Question: Should there be increased secrecy and control of science and technological information? Adm. Bobby Inman, deputy director of Central Intelligence, and Frank Press,



Drawings by Perico Pastor

president of the National Academy of Science, will offer answers when they appear before a joint hearing of the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. 9 A.M. Room 2318, Rayburn Office Building.

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ON PAGE A-1

WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL (DE)
28 MARCH 1982

STATINTL

Pentagon casts eye

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By JOE TRENTO
Staff reporter

WASHINGTON — NASA has title to a technological prize that may ignite a bureaucratic war hotter than anything the 100-ton space shuttle will encounter in its searing re-entries.

As NASA issues public relations pronouncements about how the shuttle can be used to launch business satellites, study production in space, and improve our lot on earth — planners at the CIA and Pentagon envision a far different future for the world's first operational space transportation system. War.

Interviews with NASA, Defense Department and intelligence officials, congressmen, and a variety of secret documents from those same agencies show:

- The Air Force and CIA are heading for a battle over the multi-billion dollar spy satellite program. Early flight tests show the shuttle a potentially cheaper and more reliable platform for spying from space than the elaborate CIA satellites that have cost billions to develop.

- If space treaties now in effect were scrapped the shuttle could deploy large nuclear warheads in earth orbit saving billions of dollars over the proposed MX program now before Congress.

- Shuttles could be equipped with automated devices that could disrupt Soviet computer and microwave communications.

- A Defense Department study shows computer controlled lasers aboard the shuttle could be used to destroy Soviet nuclear warheads.

- The shuttle could be used to orbit biological and chemical weapons stockpiles that could be brought to their targets on command back from space.

The CIA, in an assessment of Soviet reaction to the reusable spaceship, said in the view of the Kremlin's experts the shuttle "negates" the Soviet's ability to launch more and heavier nuclear weapons. It is, the assessment went on, "perceived to be the single greatest American threat of the Soviets."

to be joined by 1985 by Discovery and Atlantis.

A private company, Space Transportation Co. Inc., has proposed buying a fifth orbiter for the fleet in exchange for worldwide commercial marketing rights of the shuttle. No decision has been made on that offer by NASA.

Technicians are now rewiring the Lyndon B. Johnson Spacecenter in Houston to protect the communications for future shuttle missions from prying Soviet ears.

Air Force officials require all NASA and contractor employees to have security clearances to work on the shuttle operations.

The fourth launch of Columbia, set for late June, will orbit the first spy sensor package for the Air Force.

The laser sensor package is designed to help define targets for nuclear tipped rockets.

With that launch, the American space program — always a wide-open affair — will begin to shut out the glare of publicity in the name of national security, something the Soviet Union has done for more than 25 years.

The television pictures, the open communications, the good news and bad Americans are so used to getting will be a thing of the past.

In the late 1980s, the program will become even more secretive as the shuttle is sent into polar orbit from a new launch site being built at the Western Test Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.

That launch is being designed to hide the shuttle from observation while it is being loaded with cargo.

"In 1971 NASA had to make a pact with the devil to get its space shuttle through Richard Nixon and Congress and now the devil wants his part of the action" an angry member of the Senate Intelligence Committee said. That senator asked not to be named.

The pact the senator refers to is a bizarre partnership NASA made with the Air Force to sell the expensive program to Congress. Though the military has not invested one dime in the \$10 billion development program, the Air Force gave "its moral support" to the value of the shuttle.

Charles
for NASA
role: "Who
offer mor
fened the
NASA at times.

The space agency, beset in the early 1970s by slender post-Apollo budgets was grateful for the help and made major and costly development changes in the shuttle. One design change was to accommodate the 35,000-pound bulk and 15-foot girth of spy satellites that the CIA was designing for deployment on the shuttle by the Air Force.

According to one document, the space agency proposed a narrower 12-foot cargo bay in order to save several hundred million dollars in development costs. The Air Force rejected the idea because designs for future spy satellites already were based on the 15-foot width in the shuttle's hold.

What was not anticipated by the military was just how effective a ship the shuttle would be. As late as last spring internal Air Force memos suggested that NASA would not be able to deliver a flyable shuttle "for several years," and the Air Force warned the CIA that spy satellites already in production might have to be redesigned for launch on conventional boosters.

But last Nov. 12, when Columbia was launched on its second test flight, a primitive batch of equipment in its cargo bay sent back results that ended up rocking the intelligence community.

A group of Jet Propulsion Laboratory and NASA scientists were told that instead of flying ballast to fill the cargo bay of the second test flight of the shuttle, there would be room for an experiment. Using old electronics — some of it from the Apollo program — Brooten Schardte, a scientist with NASA's Office of Space Terrestrial Applications, designed the OSTA I experiment.

That experiment, using a primitive optical recorder from the Apollo days, was a simple geological survey using ground imaging radar.

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ON PAGE 80

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
22 MARCH 1982

Letters to the Editor

Ultra Secret

Re "Classifying Science" (AW&ST Feb. 8, p. 10), I'm surprised that Adm. Inman didn't use the classic example of Ultra, the secret Allied operation that successfully cracked the German military code during World War 2. Although conducted on a fairly massive scale, Ultra was never leaked.

Churchill referred to the Ultra people as "the geese who laid the golden eggs but never cackled."

While how much security is a difficult question in peacetime and in an open society, we need only remember that the Soviet Union is on a course of world domination and that the U. S. is their ultimate prize. Then strengthened security, but conducted with reason and restraint, becomes easier to accept. In this debate, score a point for Adm. Inman.

DEAM W. GIVEN
La Mesa, Calif.

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ON PAGE 13AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
22 MARCH 1982

Nailing Down the Threat

Editorial

For those who lived through the Cuban missile crisis 20 years ago, reconnaissance revelation by revelation, the Nicaraguan picture show conducted by U. S. intelligence agencies had a familiar ring. The Reagan Administration played it better this time than the Kennedy Administration did then, though it almost fell into the same error of waving around at a briefing the hard evidence it had from the naked eye of the camera but then not releasing it for the citizenry to examine.

That would have been a bigger blunder than in the Cuban confrontation, because the country is still in the grip of the post-Vietnam War malaise that revolts at any suggestion of U. S. military intervention in the Third World social upheavals. Fortunately, after first telling the press at the Nicaraguan briefing that the reconnaissance photos could be photographed by anyone who had a camera handy, copies were handed out the following day.

While the reconnaissance evidence does nothing to tell the political white hats from the black hats in Central America, the picture of a rising Soviet presence in Nicaragua is unmistakable. Runway extensions, Soviet antiaircraft gun emplacements, revetments for soon-to-be-delivered MiG fighters, Soviet military helicopters parked on airport ramps—all make for a hollow ring to any talk about simple agrarian reformers in America's backyard.

The resemblances to the Cuban crisis were only superficial. John T. Hughes, deputy director for intelligence and external affairs of the Defense Intelligence Agency who acted as the briefer for the Nicaraguan photos, was playing much the same role he did in the Cuban press briefing melee. Instead of Defense Secretary McNamara sharing the platform as he did then, waving the Cuban pictures and then proclaiming they were too secret for the American public to see, Adm. Bobby Inman of the Central Intelligence Agency provided a more credible presence for the Nicaraguan exercise. Even the pictures had an aura of reenactment, with identification labels that looked as if they were typed with the same machine that cranked them out for Cuba 20 years ago.

Less Sophisticated Equipment

What the labels called out in Nicaragua is far less sophisticated than the missile crates, launchers and warhead storage bunkers that the Air Force U-2 and Navy F-8s smoked out in 1962. After the disillusionment of Vietnam, there is good reason to look askance at a U. S. military solution to the Central American problem or at a repeat of the famous eyeball-to-eyeball Kennedy-to-Khrushchev facedown of the Cuban crisis.

Indifference is not the answer either. Release of the reconnaissance photos was a wise move by the Administration. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500260001-7

Soviet hand was caught stirring a troubled pot. The Soviet and Nicaraguan bleating when the hard evidence hit the streets produced some lame justifications for the social value of revetments and troop training camps, Soviet style.

Because the arming of Central America has a semblance of being less lethal in 1982 than that of Cuba was in 1962, the situation is more insidious. The U. S. is divided as might be expected on supporting either an unpalatable right-wing anti-Soviet government or an equally unpalatable Marxist left-wing revolution. Yet the long-term strategic implications of a Soviet foothold in Central America are adverse to this country. It is another Western Hemisphere port of call for Soviet submarines like Cuba, another airport site for Soviet Tu-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft to refuel, another base for exporting revolution to South America. The veiled Soviet threat last week to counter U. S. nuclear missile deployment in Europe rests on the availability of potential Soviet launch sites in this hemisphere.

Step in the Right Direction

Release of the reconnaissance photos of Nicaragua did not create a political consensus on the Central American problem in the epic way that the Cuban pictures galvanized the country. It was only one step in the right direction, but it was an important one. The Reagan Administration should apply its rationale to its broader policy on national security information, keeping in mind that one hard reconnaissance photo is worth a thousand words of warning about the growth of the Soviet threat.

The new White House draft policy on revisions to the executive order on security classification is a good example of moving in the wrong direction to try to create and maintain a political consensus on the need to rebuild U. S. military strength. The draft makes little substantive change in security information policy, but an enormous change in intent. Instead of the principle embodied in the last revision that information should be unclassified unless there is justification for classifying it, the new draft takes the tack that information should be classified unless there is a case made for releasing it. No bureaucrat worth his salt will miss the point. It makes it plain to the working troops that there is no risk in stamping everything, but plenty of career hazard in opting for release.

Not only will the new order confirm what the Administration's opponents in the media consider its repressive tendencies, but it will alienate segments of the press that might otherwise support the Administration.

Laying the cards on the table is a better way to deal with the American public than retreating into secrecy. Instead of unveiling phony Latin defectors who Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500260001-7 on the public platform, the Administration should continue to use the hard technical evidence it has to make its strategic case.

Currents in the News

The U.S. Case Against Nicaragua

Convinced that Marxist-run Nicaragua has become the prime launching pad for Communist subversion throughout Central America, the Reagan administration in early March stepped up a war of nerves and words against Managua's Sandinista regime.

In a flood of high-level briefings, pronouncements by top officials and testimony before Congress, the White House pressed to spell out the rising danger of Nicaragua to its neighbors.

The administration campaign had these two objectives—

- Serve notice on Managua that the U.S. will not tolerate what it sees as a huge military buildup—aided by Cuba and Russia—that far exceeds Nicaragua's legitimate defense needs.

- Pressure Nicaragua into ending what American officials regard as direct intervention on the side of leftist guerrillas in neighboring El Salvador. Washington charged that the Sandinistas, in concert with Cuba, are funneling Soviet-made arms and supplies to rebels battling to overthrow a U.S.-supported civilian-military junta.

Opening of the war of nerves was seen by some analysts as a stage setter for more-powerful U.S. action against Nicaragua if it continues its military buildup and aid to Salvadoran rebels.

Fueling such speculation was the administration's refusal to deny published reports that Washington was secretly developing a paramilitary force of Latin Americans to be used in attacks against vital economic targets in Nicaragua. The objective would be to disrupt the economy and help non-Marxist forces regain control of the country.


The Nicaraguans denied that they were aiding guerrillas in El Salvador and argued that expansion of their military forces was justified by the threat of American intervention. One Nicaraguan official expressed fear that "an incident may be fabricated" to justify a U.S.-backed attack on his country.

One of the most dramatic elements of the administration's new campaign was a March 9 press briefing conducted by Adm. Bobby Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Using aerial photographs, intelligence officials pinpointed four airfields where the Nicaraguans are lengthening runways to permit landings by military jets and building shelters to protect planes.

Also under construction are garri- sons, similar to those designed in Cuba, for a military force already the largest in Central America. Tiny Nicaragua, U.S. officials reported, has up to 70,000 men in the Army, militia and reserves.

Washington officials said privately that they had even more conclusive evidence of Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador but held it back for fear of jeopardizing intelligence sources.

Even so, critics continued to attack U.S. strategy. "What are we trying to do?" asked Representative Michael Barnes (D-Md.), chairman of the House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee. "It is almost as if the administration wants a war in Central America."




U.S. intelligence officer points to a Soviet-style training area in aerial photo of Nicaraguan buildup.

French President François Mitterrand, a strong foe of U.S. policy in Central America, had a White House meeting with Reagan on March 12, officially termed as "candid and thorough." Others described it as frosty.

Mitterrand, whose Socialist government has sold arms to Nicaragua and recognized the El Salvador rebels as a legitimate political force, said of the region's problems: "Our first duty is to fight against poverty and exploitation of human beings and the domination on the part of bloody dictatorships."

The conclusion of many analysts: As the reaction in Congress and the unresolved differences with Mitterrand underscored, the White House faces difficulties in making a convincing case for its Central American strategy. □



STATINTL

Bruce Hoertel

Hughes points out a military installation: Longer and louder alarms about communist meddling in America's backyard

Taking Aim at Nicaragua

The lights dimmed, the projector beamed and the screen filled with blown-up aerial photographs that conjured up an earlier time of confrontation. Before a packed house of reporters, John Hughes, the photo-intelligence expert who presented the evidence in the Cuban missile crisis twenty years ago, took a pointer last week and made the Reagan Administration's case against Nicaragua. Flipping through the grainy photographs, Hughes said the Sandinistas have built 36 new military installations in just two years. He pointed to new airfields, lengthened runways and a dramatic array of Soviet-made tanks, truck-drawn howitzers, helicopters and amphibious ferries. He showed Nicaraguan troops in training and put the total number of men under arms at 70,000—the biggest and most threatening army in Central America. "Who is helping the Sandinistas do this?" he asked. "The fingerprint we find, in every case . . . [belongs to] the Cubans."

The carefully orchestrated show-and-tell session was the most successful element in a ragged propaganda blitz last week. The offensive seemed to reflect the Administration's growing frustration over the limits of its ability to act in Central America. Neither Congress nor the public seems inclined to accept Reagan's warnings about communist meddling in the region. The public mood has all but ruled out direct military intervention.

As a result, the Administration has found itself with few alternatives other than sound ever longer and louder alarms.

It was hard to say what the alarm bells foretold. Washington seemed to be playing a high-stakes game of psychological warfare designed to keep the Nicaraguans, Cubans and Soviets guessing about Reagan's ultimate intentions. One possibility was that the Administration was hoping to use its evi-

The Administration launches a frenetic propaganda campaign that leaves troubling questions unanswered.

dence to enlist other Latin American nations to help cut the flow of arms to Salvadoran leftists. Looming behind it all was the prospect of a darker plan: a CIA proposal to help paramilitary groups cut the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

There was no doubt about the earnestness of the Administration's concern, but its media campaign raised as many questions as it answered. While the photo evidence demonstrated that the Sandinistas had been far

from candid about the size of their military buildup, nothing in the declassified material showed a direct conduit of arms into El Salvador. "I think most people were ready to believe that the Nicaraguans are building up their army," said one U.S. official, "but that was never the problem."

The Administration hoped to make the Nicaragua-Salvador connection with a parade of witnesses from the front—but the first step went disastrously awry. The State Department invited six reporters to interview Orlando José Tardencillas Espinosa, 19, a Nicaraguan captured in El Salvador. Tardencillas had "confessed" earlier that he had been sent to the war zone by the Sandinistas. But when the tape recorders started rolling, he stunned the reporters—and U.S. officials—by suddenly taking back everything he had said. He described himself as a free-lance revolutionary and said he had been tortured and beaten into collaborating with El Salvador and Washington. "The day before I came, an officer from the U.S. Embassy told me what I should say," he said. "He told me they needed to demonstrate the presence of Cubans in El Salvador. I was given a choice. I could come here and do what I'm doing—or face certain death."

Tardencillas's bizarre turnabout left the Administration in a bind. For weeks officials had been hinting that they had top-secret intelligence data on the Sandinistas' **CONTINUED**

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TIME
22 MARCH 1982

COVER STORIES

A Lot of Show, but N

The U.S. bungles its evidence of foreign subversion in El



There were briefings and consultations, complete with spy-plane pictures and closed-door revelations of secret intercepts. It may have been the most intense national security

information campaign since President Kennedy went public with graphic documentation of the Cuban missile threat 20 years ago. The purpose of the blitz was to convince skeptics of the correctness of the Administration's approach to the critical problems of El Salvador and its neighbors—namely, that the struggles in Central America are not simply indigenous revolts but rather are crucial battlegrounds in a broad East-West confrontation.

Facing a credibility gap at home and abroad, the Reagan Administration sought to prove that the fire raging in El Salvador is primarily fueled by Soviet-sponsored subversion spread by Cuban surrogates and the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. In that extreme and simple form, their case is as yet unproved, and indeed—by the very nature of these conflicts—may never be. In a lesser form—that there is significant involvement by Cuba and Nicaragua—the case is almost self-evident.

The campaign, to say the least, had its problems. In fact, the inability of the Administration to line up convincing witnesses would have seemed farcical were the matter not so serious. First there was the so-called "smoking Sandinista," grandly touted as a captured Nicaraguan commando who had helped lead the insurrection in El Salvador. But when police let him loose to show the way to one of his purported contacts, he disappeared into San Salvador's Mexican embassy, which said he was only a student and granted him asylum. Then there were two Nicaraguan air force defectors who were scheduled to bear witness to their country's involvement in El Salvador but by week's end were judged "not ready" to face the press. Finally, there was a young Nicaraguan soldier who was produced by the State Department but then promptly repudiated his previous statements about being trained in Cuba and Ethiopia and having been sent into El Salvador by his government. The U.S. did have solid evidence of a major military buildup in Nicaragua, and former high national security officials were persuaded by still secret intelligence that the Sandinistas were helping the El Salvador rebels. Nonetheless, the blunders

and bad luck over the live witnesses to that subversion greatly undermined the Administration's plausibility.

Presiding over this curious series of public presentations was the prime proponent of the Administration's us-vs.-them world view, Secretary of State Alexander Haig. "This situation is global in character," he told a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee last week. "The problem is worldwide Soviet interventionism that poses an unprecedented challenge to the free world. Anyone attempting to debate the prospects for a successful outcome in

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advisers who were reluctant to detract national attention from the President's economic program. Convinced that this battle would be cleanly and quickly won, the



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NEW YORK TIMES
21 MARCH 1982

STATINTL

U.S. CHARGES CUBA PLOTS TO DISRUPT SALVADORAN VOTE

State Department Paper Says
Castro Ordered Increase
in Arms for Guerrillas

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 20 — The Reagan Administration said today that it had information that three months ago Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader, ordered a step-up in arms shipments to insurgents in El Salvador in an effort to disrupt the March 28 elections there.

The State Department also said it had learned that after a meeting in Havana in mid-December between the Cubans and Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, "extreme leftist groups throughout Central America were mobilized to support the effort."

But a department spokesman declined to make public the source of the information, saying it was based on sensitive intelligence data whose release would compromise sources and possibly endanger lives.

11-Page Paper Issued

Also today, the United States said it would not oppose an urgent Security Council meeting sought by Nicaragua to present charges that Washington was threatening invasion. [Page 22.]

The State Department's accusations were made in an 11-page paper issued today, titled "Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for the Salvadoran Insurgency."

Dean Fischer, the department spokesman, said the document was intended as a summary of outside involvement in the Salvadoran civil war. Its purpose, he said, was "not to produce new revelations, but to describe the general pattern of outside support for El Salvador's guerrillas, including arms supply, training and command and control."

The report, released in an unusual

Saturday briefing, produced a few previously unpublicized details of what the Administration has been calling a substantial arms buildup in El Salvador since the beginning of the year. It described routes and methods of shipping weapons. But it contained no sensitive intelligence material.

"We cannot make this intelligence available publicly," Mr. Fischer said. "Were it to be released, the United States Government would lose access to critical information, and might well risk the lives of some brave people who believe it is important that the Government of the United States know what is going on. A government that does not keep secrets does not receive them."

The report said that Cuban and Nicaraguan arms supplies were reaching El Salvador by air, by land through Nicaragua and Honduras and by sea across the Gulf of Fonseca to the eastern Salvadoran province of Usulután. Three Nicaraguan ships — the Monimbo, the Aracely and the Nicarao — were identified as transporters of weapons.

The paper reported for the first time how the Administration believes the Papalonal airfield, northwest of Managua, has been used in the airlifting and storing of arms. It also described what it identified as the Salvadoran guerrilla command and control center near Managua. The Administration has protested the existence of this center to the Sandinist Government in Managua.

The report said that recent deliveries of arms to the guerrillas included American-made M-60 machine guns, 57-millimeter recoilless rifles and M-72 antitank weapons. The paper said that early this month a guerrilla group in El Salvador received several thousand sticks of dynamite and detonators. "Only five sticks of TNT are sufficient to blow up an electrical pylon," the report noted.

Publication of the paper comes eight days before the voting in El Salvador for a 60-member constituent assembly and amid increasing signs that the Administration is preparing to negotiate an end to the civil conflict soon after the elections.

There is concern in the Administration that extreme right-wing forces in El Salvador could emerge stronger than had been expected in the voting for the assembly, which will be charged with plotting the country's political future. Such an outcome would threaten the governing Christian Democratic-led, which is supported by the United States.

The junta has staked much of its hopes for legitimacy on a fair election and is hoping for a large enough voter turnout to deflect charges that the voting would not be representative of the Salvadoran people. Left-wing political

The release of the paper today, along with a State Department history of the insurgent movement in El Salvador and a compendium of comments from "distinguished Americans supporting the charges of Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador," follows several Administration attempts to produce evidence of outside backing for and control of Salvadoran guerrillas.

On March 9, Adm. Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and John T. Hughes, Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Affairs for the Defense Intelligence Agency, briefed reporters on evidence of a Nicaraguan military buildup, with descriptions and aerial photographs of what were described as Cuban- and Soviet-style military installations.

At that briefing, reporters were told that the Nicaraguan forces were larger than the country needed for defensive purposes and that there was evidence of installations being prepared for insurgency training.

On March 12, the State Department produced for reporters a young man Administration officials said was a Nicaraguan sent to fight in El Salvador. At that meeting, the Nicaraguan, Orlando José Tardencilla Ezpinosa, suddenly recanted statements he had made earlier about his training and his role in El Salvador, saying that he had gone there on his own and had not been sent by his Government.

A number of Senators and Representatives have been shown classified intelligence material in private briefings. Several, including Robert W. Kasten Jr., the Wisconsin Republican who is chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, have said publicly that the proof of Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador is convincing.

However, opponents of continued military aid to El Salvador, among them Senator Paul E. Tsongas, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Representative Michael D. Barnes, Democrat of Maryland, have said that, while there is evidence of Nicaraguan support, they do not agree with the Administration's response to the situation.

Critics of the Administration's policy have introduced several pieces of legislation with the object of preventing any possible American military action, open or covert, against Nicaragua.

Haig and Mexican Confer

Last weekend, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. met in New York with Mexico's Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda, to discuss a Mexican proposal to bring the United States, Cuba and Nicaragua together for talks.

There have been reports among diplomats that Mr. Haig has been in contact with Cuban and Nicaraguan officials recently, but that the Administration intends to make no public moves on talks until after the Salvadoran elections March 28.

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
21 March 1982

Castro said to increase arms flow

U.S. asserts Cuba aims to disrupt Salvadoran voting

By Henry Trehwitt
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—In mid-December, the State Department reported yesterday, Cuban President Fidel Castro ordered a heavy increase in arms shipments to insurgents in El Salvador with the immediate objective of disrupting the elections scheduled for next Sunday.

The weapons have been used, it said, through commands issued by insurgency headquarters near Managua, Nicaragua.

Before and since Mr. Castro's order, according to the department's account, the Nicaraguan vessels Monimbo, Aracely and Nicarao have made many arms runs from Cuba to Nicaragua. From there, it said, the arms were distributed to El Salvador directly by air or overland through Honduras and Guatemala, and indirectly through Costa Rica.

The Papalonal air field near Managua was cited as the base for "direct airlift" of weapons to guerrillas. Serial numbers on arms caches seized in Guatemala showed that the weapons were among those left behind by American troops in Vietnam.

With such details, the administration sharpened its charges that Cuba and Nicaragua, with Soviet support, sustain the insurgency in El Salvador and growing violence elsewhere in Central America. It drew on the recorded remarks of Cuban, Nicaraguan and insurgent leaders, despite their formal denials, to support its case.

In an additional move to reinforce its position, the administration summarized the reactions to private briefings of prominent Americans representing a wide political spectrum. Their remarks argue that still-secret information demonstrates Nicaragua's role as a base for the Salvadoran insurgency.

What the administration did not reveal yesterday was detailed intelligence on which some of its conclusions were based, such as agent reports and electronic interceptions. To do so, said Dean Fischer, the State Department spokesman, "might risk the lives of some brave people who believe it is important that the government of the United States know what is going on."

"A government that does not keep secrets does not receive them," he said. "The purpose here is thus not to produce new revelations, but to describe the general pattern of outside support for El Salvador's guerrillas, including arms supply, training and command and control."

In fact, however, the three documents released

yesterday—dealing with the Cuban-Nicaraguan roles, the insurgent organization in El Salvador and the "statements by distinguished Americans"—did contain new details. They were one more in a series of recent actions to strengthen the administration position in support of the Salvadoran junta under President Jose Napoleon Duarte.

Two weeks ago, Adm. Bobby Inman, the deputy director of central intelligence, made public details—including photographs—of Nicaragua's own military buildup. Officials at that time promised a second public briefing to show links between the Salvadoran insurgency and its outside supporters.

Secret details were provided to Congress and groups of private citizens, mostly former officials of both Republican and Democratic administrations. Meanwhile, a brisk debate continued within the administration about what details to make public. Yesterday's release of the three papers, essentially a compromise, was the result.

The documents made three basic points. The first, regarding arms supplies, was reinforced by evidence as diverse as reports of ship and aircraft movements and of arms supplies seized throughout Central America. In some cases, the report said, it was impossible to learn where the increasingly complex weapons were to be used, since Cuba and Nicaragua supply insurgents in Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala.

Regarding the training of guerrillas, the administration reported that seized documents show Salvadoran insurgents are instructed in both Cuba and Nicaragua. For command and control, the documents say, the five insurgent groups in El Salvador are directed by a Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) based near Managua. The insurgents are united, temporarily at least, under the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).

A separate political wing of the FMLN, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) "operates outside El Salvador" according to the report. In fact, officials say privately, many of its members are in Mexico, though that was omitted from the report to avoid offending Mexican leaders.

Most of the power in the FMLN rests with leftist groups committed to violent revolution, according to U.S. officials. Some smaller moderate groups, including Social Democrats under Guillermo Manuel Ungo, have helped to make the insurgency respectable to some Americans.

The documents, in support of the contention that the increased arms shipments were aimed at the March 28 elections, cited a raid by Costa Rican police only six days ago on a "safe house" that produced, along with nine arrests, the seizure of weapons including machine guns, explosives and grenades.

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NEW YORK TIMES
20 MARCH 1982

U.S. Military Aides Training Hondurans Increase to Up to 100

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 19 — The United States has increased the number of its military advisers in Honduras to as many as 100 since the start of the year. The State Department said the increase was meant to help enhance that country's security in the face of a military buildup in neighboring Nicaragua.

The increase makes the number of United States advisers in Honduras the largest attached to any country in Central America. In El Salvador, for instance, the number is about 55.

Advisers Training Hondurans

A State Department official said the highest number of advisers in Honduras in 1981 was 25. As recently as last September, the number was only 14.

In response to questions, the State Department said today that United States military training personnel on temporary duty in Honduras now totaled between 90 and 100, the exact number changing as advisers came and went. Their duties were described as ranging from technical and mechanical assistance to training Honduran border patrols.

Officials said the increase, which was accomplished with a minimum of publicity, was part of a coordinated plan to

insure that Honduras would be able to withstand pressures from Cuban-backed Nicaragua and would be able to increase efforts to block arms shipments passing through Honduras from Nicaragua on the way to insurgents in El Salvador. Honduras had the largest military force in Central America until the recent buildup in Nicaragua and still has the strongest air force.

The increase in United States advisers has been accompanied by a rise in military aid to Honduras — from \$10 million in the current fiscal year to more than \$15 million in the Administration's request for the fiscal year beginning in October. In addition, Honduras would receive several million dollars as part of a \$60 million supplementary request for this fiscal year; El Salvador would get \$35 million.

A State Department official said the Administration was also trying to strengthen Honduras's civilian Government, led by Dr. Roberto Suazo Córdova, which was sworn in Jan. 27. Dr. Suazo Córdova was elected in November to succeed Gen. Policarpo Paz Garcia, the third military officer to hold the office since the army toppled a civilian Government in 1972.

In sending additional equipment and advisers to Honduras, the Administration hopes to keep the Honduran military satisfied that its problems are being met, the official said.

The United States, as part of the buildup in the region, has also said it would like to expand air bases in Honduras for possible use by United States tactical fighter planes in an emergency.

Special Forces Sent

Dean Fischer, the State Department spokesman, when asked about the United States training teams in Honduras, said they were "training the Honduran military in such technical areas as helicopter maintenance, air-base security, patrol-boat maintenance and communications."

In addition, the United States has sent Special Forces groups, known as Green

Berets, to help train the Hondurans in patrolling the border areas with El Salvador. Two years ago the United States lent Honduras 10 Huey helicopters.

A central concern of the United States, made public this month at a briefing by Adm. Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, is that Nicaragua is expanding several airfields for what aerial photos suggest is the eventual basing of fighter planes and that it might receive MIG aircraft from Cuba. The Central Intelligence Agency has speculated that about 70 Nicaraguans are undergoing pilot training in Cuba and Bulgaria.

The authoritative "Military Balance," published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 1981, said the Honduran Air Force was the largest in Central America, with a fighter-bomber squadron of 12 Super Mystères, made by France and renovated by Israel, and 6 United States-made F-86 fighters of Korean War vintage. It also has six A-37B fighters made in the United States and is getting more.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
16 March 1982

Philip Geyelin

Slide Shows and Domino Games

The crazy, mixed-up quality of the Reagan administration's approach to Central America came nicely into focus while the CIA's No. 2 man, Adm. Bobby Inman, was angrily putting on his slide show of aerial photos in the State Department auditorium to prove that Nicaragua is fast becoming a Cuban-style "Soviet bastion." That same day, the State Department's spokesman, Dean Fischer, was earnestly brooding out loud in the press room about the possibility of "irregularities" in Guatemala's election returns.

Inman was "angry," not so much at the Nicaraguans, as he was at the need (in the land of the free) to justify whatever the administration has in mind for the region—military intervention, "going to the source"—with reasonably persuasive evidence. Still, his evidence was arguable.

Fischer's stern demand for prompt assurance that the Guatemalan vote be "fully and accurately counted," on the other hand, was merely laughable.

But not in Guatemala. A Guatemalan listening to the hand-picked candidate of the bloody-minded military government, Gen. Angel Anibal Guevara, as he claimed to have "won these elections freely and cleanly through hard work," could die laughing.

"I am going to defend my triumph in the streets, if necessary," the general said, and you better believe him. He is a former minister of defense. The defense ministry, according to Amnesty International, helps draw up the "death lists" that have given the Guatemalan government its well-earned reputation as perhaps the hemisphere's most murderous. In a quarter-century of military rule, Guatemalan "security forces" have slaughtered tens of thousands of opponents, suspected dissidents and innocents.

The government has weathered two leftist insurrections. It is now wracked by a third, and Assistant Secretary of State Tom Enders, in charge of hemisphere affairs, has rated Guatemala as "ultimately the chief target for Cuba and the Soviet Union" in Central

America. But its criminal human rights record has disqualified it for American support even by the Reagan administration's permissive standards—beyond several million dollars worth of jeeps and trucks.

So what was being laid on us at the State Department last week was a pretty grisly catalogue of analogues.

First, Nicaragua shaping up as "another Cuba"—only worse. "This time the ocean barriers aren't there," said Inman. "They can move more easily into Central American countries."

Second, a supposedly irrefutable Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan connection with the insurgency in El Salvador, which could turn that country into yet "another Cuba"—only worse. It, too, is on the mainland, abutting not only Honduras but Guatemala. Meantime, to congressional critics and a lot of other people, El Salvador already looks all too spookily like "another Vietnam."

And finally, in Guatemala, "another El Salvador"—only worse on two counts. First, it is the biggest country in Central America (the size of Ohio), the most populous, with heavy U.S. investment; it has oil, it borders on Mexico, which has a whole lot of oil and borders on us. Second, the new government offers scant promise of the change of heart on human rights that would qualify it for American backing, Salvadoran style.

Even if the administration found some pretext, Congress, which is already sour enough on aid to El Salvador, would almost certainly resist. So where are we, analogue-wise: "Another Cuba" or two, "another El Salvador," another Viet...?"

Eureka! Which is to say that we may just have stumbled on one Vietnam-era analogy in all this that even the administration cannot reject: the compulsion of our crisis managers, then as now, to deal in the shorthand of ill-fitting and often unfulfilled analogies.

We went into Vietnam, remember, to avoid "another Munich." If we didn't "draw the line," Dwight D. Eisenhower's "dominoes" would fall. As

variously identified, they came to include not just the rest of Indochina (Laos and Cambodia) that did fall, but a long row that didn't: Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia. (Lyndon B. Johnson threw in Honolulu.)

The "domino theory," in short, is not a reliable analogy. In the grim way the administration is now applying it to Central America, it invites another clutch of analogues, closer to hand but no more reliable: "Another Cuban missile crisis"? "Another Bay of Pigs"?

A sounder approach might be one for which no analogy comes to mind. You could begin by asking why, if neighboring Mexico is the ultimate "domino," it has taken so dim a view of the administration's policy? If Ronald Reagan is serious about ruling out "brute force," as he has said he is, his best hope almost certainly lies in less theater in the State Department auditorium and more strenuous and accommodating diplomatic efforts—in concert with the Mexicans.

STATINTL

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Restraints will chill technology

The Reagan Administration has put the nation's scientific and technical community on notice that it intends to clamp new restraints both on the export of U.S. advanced technology and on traditional academic freedoms.

Speaking recently before an American Academy for the Advancement of Science symposium on "Striking a Balance: Scientific Freedom and National Security," Admiral Bobby Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and past director of the National Security Agency, warned scientists, "I think the tides are moving and moving fast toward legislative solutions. There will be pressure for legislation to stop the hemorrhage of the nation's technologies."

The "lock-it-up" thrust of the Reagan Administration is sure to have a chilling effect both on our nation's campuses and on high-technology industries, including the personal-computer industry.

The full scope of the Administration's plans, including a draft executive order, restrictive Congressional legislation and a Pentagon attempt to broaden the definition of classified information to include potentially anything of a technical nature, will become evident in the coming months as attempts are made to whip up public support for new provisions.

Inman told the scientific community that the cloak of secrecy is going to extend far beyond the boundaries of the military research-and-development community.

"In terms of harm to the national interest, it makes little difference whether the data is copied from technical journals in a library or given away by a member of our society to an agency of a foreign power," he said.

Among technologies that the Administration is anxious to contain, computers and semiconductors are high on the list.

The semiconductor industry grew initially from the heavily classified Minuteman Missile program. The integrated circuit is, in a sense, a result of the need to squeeze more electronics into missile warheads.

Since the early 1970s, however, the genie has escaped the bottle. Dramatic advances in microelectronics have come from private industry, not the military. To a large degree, the rapid progress of technology has been due to free technical interchange and the emergence of many open technical and engineering "communities" such as Silicon Valley.

Now the youthful energy and open competitiveness of this industry may be brought to a screeching halt.

New export restrictions on microelectronic technology and on computer software will serve to isolate the U.S. from world markets, which Japan and France will eagerly grasp.

Most significantly, however, restrictions on open reporting of research-and-development work will slow progress and put an end to U.S. technology leads more effectively than any leaked secret possibly could.

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The "lock-it-up" thrust of the Reagan Administration is sure to have a chilling effect both on our nation's campuses and on high-technology industries, including the personal-computer industry.

The full scope of the Administration's plans, including a draft executive order, restrictive Congressional legislation and a Pentagon attempt to broaden the definition of classified information to include potentially anything of a technical nature, will become evident in the coming months as attempts are made to whip up public support for new provisions.

Inman told the scientific community that the cloak of secrecy is going to extend far beyond the boundaries of the military research-and-development community.

"In terms of harm to the national interest, it makes little difference whether the data is copied from technical journals in a library or given away by a member of our society to an agency of a foreign power," he said.

Among technologies that the Administration is anxious to contain, computers and semiconductors are high on the list.

The semiconductor industry grew initially from the heavily classified Minuteman Missile program. The integrated circuit is, in a sense, a result of the need to squeeze more electronics into missile warheads.

Since the early 1970s, however, the genie has escaped the bottle. Dramatic advances in microelectronics have come from private industry, not the military. To a large degree, the rapid progress of technology has been due to free technical interchange and the emergence of many open technical and engineering "communities" such as Silicon Valley.

Now the youthful energy and open competitiveness of this industry may be brought to a screeching halt.

New export restrictions on microelectronic technology and on computer software will serve to isolate the U.S. from world markets, which Japan and France will eagerly grasp.

Most significantly, however, restrictions on open reporting of research-and-development work will slow progress and put an end to U.S. technology leads more effectively than any leaked secret possibly could.

CONTINUED

In the end, rather than saving vital high-tech "secrets" that may allow the Soviets to build new weapons, the Reagan Administration will only succeed in harming U.S. national security by stripping the scientific community of its vitality.

Perhaps a better solution for protecting the U.S. technological lead would be to double or even triple federal nonmilitary R&D spending. This would serve to expand critical basic research dramatically and to increase the supply of young scientists and engineers.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin once said that the capitalist would sell his enemies the rope for his own hanging. On the subject of restrictions on scientific research and high-technology exports, one wonders why the Reagan Administration has chosen to believe Lenin rather than one of our own, Thomas Edison, who once exhorted an audience, "If they [the communists] talk from soapboxes, let the businessman go into the soapbox business. —JM

15 March 1982

Censoring science

The Reagan administration has decided to try to throw a blanket of censorship over American high technology that might find its way to foreign countries, particularly the Soviet Union. But the administration's medicine could be worse than the disease.

Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, the deputy director of central intelligence, proposes that even some private scientific and technical research — not pursued with government financial support — should sometimes be covered by a state secrets law.

Admiral Inman wants to reduce the accessibility of substantial amounts of highly technical data through published sources that Eastern bloc scientists can now read in U.S. libraries. Reasoning that U.S. technological advantages are vital to national security, the admiral proposes a government screening of articles published about research related to computers, semi-conductors and other high-technology products and processes.

Many American scientific researchers fear that the censoring of basic research would be carried out by a monstrously inefficient bureaucracy that would stifle the very research on which American high technology depends, because superior technology arises from a free ex-

change of ideas. As Peter J. Denning, head of Purdue University's Department of Computer Science, noted recently: "If you want to win the Indy 500, you build the fastest car. You don't throw nails on the track."

The Inman approach is logical and springs directly from a view that the United States is giving the rest of the world too much to read about basic human knowledge. But history also makes it clear that scientific innovation inevitably becomes a commonly held patrimony. Equally important is the fact that the problem of high technology being passed to the Soviets has as much to do with the failure of the government to regulate the export of sensitive products as with the gleaning of information by Soviet scholars from U.S. publications.

The outstanding "loss" of American technology to the Soviets in the 1970s occurred when the Nixon administration approved the sale of machine tools to grind the precision ball bearings now being used in the inertial guidance systems of the most accurate Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.

For a vexing problem, the solution is not censorship of basic research but more vigilance by the government in its own sphere.

BALTIMORE NEWS-AMERICAN
15 March 1982

Nicaragua declassified

"I'm here this afternoon because I'm concerned and because I'm angry."

This may seem like an unusual way for CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman to open a briefing for reporters at the State Department, but his words were prompted by an unusual situation. Intelligence officials had been trying to tell Congress and the public for days that there is a threatening buildup of military strength in Nicaragua, and that it is made possible by assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The reports were treated with skepticism, in Congress and elsewhere, and that was the reason for Admiral Inman's concern and anger.

At the urging of the administration, intelligence officials declassified sensitive information that included reconnaissance photographs and statistics relating the size of Nicaragua's armed forces. Release of secret information of this nature

is rare, but the administration felt the moment had arrived to tell the truth to a skeptical public.

The truth, sad to relate, is that Moscow and Havana are providing the arms and advice to give Nicaragua the largest military force in Central America. And Nicaragua, as CIA Director William J. Casey says, is fanning the flames of insurrection in El Salvador.

Admiral Inman was concerned about the need to inform Americans about what is going on on our doorstep to the south, "and what it portends for this country."

The administration is serving the best interests of the country by presenting its case with these briefings. It is an effort to open American eyes to the fact that the trouble in Central America is much more than an "internal affair" as some have insisted.

Letters to the Editor

Classified Information

Adm. Bobby Inman (Feb. 8, p. 10) proposed that it is somehow "unreasonable" to have a basic "attitude that the government and its public servants cannot be trusted" in determining what information must be protected as classified information. He obviously includes Congress and the General Accounting Office in the category of "unreasonable" since both entities have issued numerous reports over the last decade on the abuse of classification authority by government officials. Congress and GAO continue to document that public servants have consistently perverted the classification process either to conceal administrative errors or to maintain the classification of information with little objective evaluation of any national security issue.

The admiral points to the existence of an Executive Order, EO 12065, which he states "requires the eventual declassification of information." This is not completely accurate. The current EO provides for a category of classified information which in effect may never be declassified. This information is instead "reviewed" for possible declassification at some specific date, 20 or 30 years. The review authority has the option of extending the classification until another predetermined review date. The cycle could conceivably repeat itself ad infinitum. The admiral, having directed the activities of CIA and NSA, should be well aware of this "review on" marking since both agencies use it extensively.

Finally, Adm. Inman proposes the need to reach a solution between the balance of national security and science so that the federal government will not overreact. The issue is really that the federal government through him has already overreacted. "Prior review," as advocated by the admiral, is the first phase of any censorship program, whether it be in the U.S. or in the USSR.

It appears his perception of the world is constrained by his intelligence background—a background wherein "secrets" are the measure of one's importance. Surely he has access to enough NSA and CIA secrets without seeking to fabricate "secrets" already within the public domain.

CHRIS McDONALD
Las Cruces, N. M.

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
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
15 March 1982

STATINTL

Aerial Photos Show Buildup In Nicaragua

Soviet/Cuban military buildup in Nicaragua is detailed by these aerial photographs taken recently by U.S. manned reconnaissance aircraft and made available last week by the Defense Dept. Four major airfields are being configured for heavy attack aircraft, according to John T. Hughes, deputy director for intelligence and external affairs of the Defense Intelligence Agency and an interpreter of intelligence photographs. Soviet MiG-17 or MiG-21 aircraft are expected in Nicaragua sometime this year, Hughes said. The airfields include Sandino International Airfield (shown above at left), 8,000 ft. long, near the capital of Managua. In the inset (upper right) of this photograph, two Soviet Mil Mi-8 Hip helicopters are shown (AWST Dec. 21, 1981, p. 20). Hughes said the location of Soviet antiaircraft guns in this photograph reflects "typical Soviet doctrine" about such emplacements. Just off the main taxiway, Hughes said, U-shaped revetments (lower left in photo above left) have been built for the MiG-type fighter-bomber air-

craft. U.S. officials believe 50 Nicaraguan pilots are currently training in MiGs in Bulgaria and Cuba. Adm. Bobby R. Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said he had expected the newly trained pilots in Nicaragua in February, "but they're keeping them on for more advanced training. That says it's probably going to be, then, MiG-21s, not the older MiG-17s that will be coming in." The 6,000-ft. Puerto Cabezas Airfield on the Caribbean (top, right) is being lengthened 2,100 ft., Hughes said, and should be finished by the end of this month. Soviet-built antiaircraft guns are already in place to defend the field, he said. Montelimar Airfield on the Pacific coast (bottom left) is already long enough to handle all Soviet aircraft and is receiving aircraft parking and servicing facilities. "When the pilots return, and the MiGs arrive, and these airfields are completed," Hughes said, the government of Nicaragua "will probably have the best air force in Central America in terms of performance, quality and airfield serviceability." Other Soviet equipment in Nicaragua is believed to include 25 T-55 tanks with 100-mm. guns, 12 truck-drawn howitzers, 12 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and amphibious military ferries. U.S. officials said there are 2,000 Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua and up to 50 Soviet military advisers.



CONTINUED

Joseph Kraft

The Mexican Connection

The massive disclosure of intelligence data on Central America aims at two targets. Congress is one, for the administration wants to block moves that would disrupt its freedom of action.

But the major target is the government of President Lopez Portillo. For the administration's primary goal is to engage Mexico as a serious agent guarding Central America against Soviet meddling and manipulation.

Several features distinguish the recent intelligence blitz. Timing for one. The wraps started coming off at a State Department press briefing on March 9—just after a meeting in New York between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the Mexican foreign minister, Jorge Castaneda. The revelations continued through the rest of the week. It thus serves as a preface to another meeting in New York between Haig and Castaneda.

Stature is a second characteristic. The administration did not just pass the word through the routine machinery of information. Adm. B. R. Inman, the deputy director of Central Intelligence, presided over the first briefing at the State Department. Inman is probably the most highly respected professional intelligence officer in the country. Besides serving on the military side, he has experience, as a former director of the National Security Agency, in the analysis of intercepted communications. So his personal presence meant the administration was going all out.

The focus of the information released was also special. The concentration was on the development of military capacities in Nicaragua well beyond the security needs of that country. Sensitive data indicated the role of the Russians and the Cubans. If necessary, there are waiting in the wings a couple of Nicaraguan pilots who can testify they were trained in Bulgaria months ago to handle advanced Soviet jet fighters.

The full impact of all this on Congress is not easy to gauge. The ideological doves in the Senate and House are probably not going to be overwhelmed. The more so as they are receiving a blare of praise from that part of the press and television that smells another Vietnam in the making.

But the more weighty figures in Congress are apt to think twice. Inman commands genuine respect. The evidence of Soviet penetration through Cuba and Nicaragua cannot just be laughed off. So senior figures will probably put the damper on legislation that would make it impossible for this country to assert any influence, even through foreign aid, in such friendly nations as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica.

As to the Mexicans, in a speech on Feb. 21, President Lopez Portillo offered to serve as a mediator "between those who have stopped talking to each other." He indicated a willingness to bring together the government and the left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador. He implied that he would be prepared to fend off outside interference—whether from Cuba or the Soviet Union.

The missing piece in the Mexican offer is a provision for blocking the passage of military equipment through Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador. The information released with so much fanfare here in Washington last week serves to concentrate Mexican attention on that problem. The leaks about a commando force to be raised by the CIA show there is something the United States can abandon for an end to the buildup in Nicaragua. So Haig will be pressing Castaneda hard for evidence as to the seriousness of Mexican intentions, particularly in cutting the Soviet reach through Nicaragua to El Salvador.

Most Americans will hope that the effort to enlist the Mexicans succeeds. For this country is divided about Central America, and lacking in the focus afforded by significant national interests on the spot. Opponents of the administration are free to use any means available to discredit its intentions. The president's backers—as is so often the case with the right wing—are not really prepared to pay in blood or money for their foreign policy rhetoric. Thus any direct American intervention will lack staying power, and probably yield catastrophic failure.

The Mexicans, by contrast, have a vital interest in preventing the spread of Soviet influence in Central America. They have the stature, relative to the rest of the area, to promote an environment that gives wide scope to local political conflict without opening the door to Soviet interference. They have the contacts—with Cuba and the left-wingers in El Salvador and Nicaragua—to foster moderation. What is critical, and the reason this country has to show a capacity to intervene, is to make the Mexicans realize that trouble impends if they don't take their responsibility seriously.

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ON PAGE E-14

NEW YORK TIMES
14 MARCH 1982

Major News

In Summary

Nicaragua

The C.I.A. displayed aerial reconnaissance photographs to bolster Administration contentions that Cuba and other Communist countries were using Nicaragua as a conduit to support Salvadoran insurgents. The agency said the photographs proved Nicaragua was assembling the largest military force in the region. "It is vastly beyond any defensive need," said Adm. Bobby Inman, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Photographs showed new military bases, "built along Cuban design," tanks and armored personnel carriers identified as Soviet types, and four airfields being lengthened, officials said, to receive heavy military aircraft. Also shown were former Misquito Indian villages in northeast Nicaragua, which the C.I.A. charged had been leveled in preparation for future military thrusts into neighboring Honduras.

Other United States officials said the C.I.A. was providing millions of dollars in covert financial aid to individuals and organizations in Nicaragua that it considers politically progressive but not Marxist-Leninist. In addition, they said, the United States was discussing plans with Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras and other South American countries for paramilitary operations. They added that Washington is opposing any role for Nicaraguan exiles associated with the former Somoza dictatorship. The United States would not supply personnel for the operations, which

would be intended to insulate Nicaragua's neighbors from Sandinist assistance to leftist insurgencies.

Nicaragua protested United States reconnaissance flights over its territory as "a flagrant violation of international law" and said "a destabilization plan of the C.I.A. against Nicaragua is under way." The military buildup is "exclusively defensive," insisted Sergio Ramirez Mercado, a member of the Sandinist junta. Asked about C.I.A. estimates of 2,000 Cuban military advisers and 50 to 75 Soviet advisers, Mr. Ramirez asserted, "There is not a single foreign soldier in Nicaragua." Expansion at two airfields had been recommended by United States officials and begun during the Somoza regime, he said. And he challenged Washington to produce evidence of Nicaraguan weapons going to El Salvador. Mr. Ramirez and other Nicaraguans argued that, far from spurring the guerrillas on, they were concerned about repercussions if the guerrillas succeeded in disrupting the Salvadoran elections. This "would be a political failure for the United States, and we're afraid they'll pass us the bill for it," Mr. Ramirez said.

NEW YORK TIMES

13 March 1982

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FBC-DEMS(COX)

DEMOCRATS ASSAIL REAGAN INTELLIGENCE POLICIES

BY ANDREW J. GLASS

Fc. 1982 Cox News Service

WASHINGTON - A FRUSTRATED GROUP OF KEY DEMOCRATS ON CAPITOL HILL
 CONTEND THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD LITTLE OR NOTHING ABOUT WHAT PRESIDENT
 REAGAN INTENDS TO DO IN LATIN AMERICA.

THEIR COMPLAINTS FOCUS ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A DEARTH OF INTELLIGENCE
 DATA BEING SUPPLIED TO THE LEGISLATORS AS WELL AS A LACK OF CANDID
 BRIEFINGS ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES IN THIS CRITICAL REGION.

THEIR GROWING RESTIVENESS, WHICH CAME TO LIGHT IN A SERIES OF
 INTERVIEWS LAST WEEK, APPEARS TO THREATEN ANY SEMBLANCE OF A
 COORDINATED BIPARTISAN APPROACH TOWARD MOUNTING PROBLEMS IN EL
 SALVADOR AND ELSEWHERE IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN.

"THERE HAVE BEEN NO BRIEFINGS ABOUT LATIN AMERICA," SEN. GARY
 HART, D-COLO., SAID. "WHAT WE HAVE HEARD HAS BEEN CURSORY AND
 BLAND."

HART, A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND A POTENTIAL
 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 1984, SAID: "A KIND OF
 ATTITUDINAL DISTRUST FOR CONGRESS EXISTS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION. AT
 BOTTOM, THEY REGARD ALL PEOPLE IN CONGRESS AS IRRELEVANT BUFFOONS."

HART'S VIEWS, IF NOT HIS SHARP RHETORIC, WERE ECHOED BY ANOTHER
 SENATE DEMOCRAT, JOSEPH BIDEN OF DELAWARE. SPEAKING HERE TO THE
 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS
 ASSOCIATION, A GROUP OF LEADING NEWS EXECUTIVES, BIDEN REPORTEDLY
 CASTIGATED REAGAN'S ADVISERS FOR FAILING TO SHARE ANY HARD DATA ON
 THE INCREASINGLY VOLATILE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA WITH THE SENATE
 INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, ON WHICH BIDEN SERVES.

BIDEN SUGGESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION COULD END UP PAYING A HIGH
 PRICE FOR ITS LACK OF CANDOR. HIS REMARKS WERE CONFIRMED BY HIS PRESS
 SECRETARY, PETER SMITH.

ONE FOCAL POINT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC UNEASE IS A RESOLUTION INTRODUCED
 LAST MONTH BY SEN. CHRISTOPHER DODD OF CONNECTICUT, A MEMBER OF THE
 INTELLIGENCE PANEL, CALLING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ENCOURAGE
 UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CESS-FIRE IN EL SALVADOR. THAT
 APPROACH IS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG
 JR., WHO CONTENDS THAT CUBA AND NICARAGUA ARE TRYING TO FOMENT AN
 ANTI-AMERICAN MARXIST UPRISAL IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN.